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word “deficit” in “trade deficit” has the same
connotation. I intend to use the words “surplus”
and “deficit” as simple descriptive words and
hope that in listening to me you can consciously
ignore the baggage that the words commonly carry.
My purpose is to analyze the external imbalance
to see why we might, or might not, be concerned
about it.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I appreciate comments provided
by my colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis. Michael R. Pakko, senior economist in
the Research Division, provided special assistance.
I take full responsibility for errors.
To emphasize the importance of thinking
through the analysis and not letting the word
“deficit” decide the issue, consider the situation
faced by many healthy corporations. It is common
for a thriving company to spend more than its
revenues, making up the difference by borrowing.
When a company borrows to finance spending
on capital, the company may be said to have a
deficit on current account—its total spending on
goods and services, including new capital, exceeds
its revenues. The company simultaneously has a
surplus on capital account—more funds are flow-
ing into the company to buy the company’s shares
and bonds than the company is investing in simi-
lar securities issued by others. Arithmetically,
the company has a current account deficit and a
capital account surplus, and thus has an “imbal-
ance.” Whether the company is suffering from
an economic imbalance depends on the produc-
tivity of its capital investments. Sometimes com-
I
am very pleased to be here today to visit
with the Tucson Chapter of the Association
for Investment Management Research. I
say “visit with” because I do hope that
when I finish speaking we can engage in some
questions and answers and comments about my
chosen topic. International economic issues—
especially trade issues—are hot topics these days.
Through my concentration on capital markets
issues, my intention is to emphasize just how
important international capital flows are to the
United States. In the process, I hope to shed
some light, and not just add to the heat, on trade
issues by exploring the intimate connections
between international trade and international
capital flows.
Recent economic indicators have suggested
that the long-awaited acceleration of the recovery
from the 2001 recession is under way. According
to the advance estimate from the Department of
Commerce, real GDP growth—the broadest meas-
ure of the strength of the economy—increased at
a 7.2 percent annual rate in the third quarter, and
the latest employment data show that the accel-
erated growth is fueling job creation after many
months of stagnation.
Through all the ups and downs of the U.S.
economy over the past two decades, a staple of
the situation has been a deficit in the U.S. inter-
national trade accounts and a corresponding sur-
plus in the international capital accounts. Many
observers are troubled by this persistent state of
affairs and are concerned that the trade deficit
might derail the economic recovery. It is common
to refer to the situation as an “imbalance,” which
naturally implies that something is wrong. Thepanies do invest in capital and businesses that
turn out not to yield returns sufficient to service
the debt financing the investments. Such a situa-
tion, when repeated over the years, is not sustain-
able. For a company, and as I will argue for a
country, whether continuing infusions of finan-
cial capital are sustainable depends on how the
financial capital is employed.
CURRENT AND CAPITAL
ACCOUNTS IN THE BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS
The most widely cited measure of the U.S.
external imbalance is the trade deficit—the differ-
ence between U.S. exports and imports. More gen-
erally, it is useful to concentrate on the broader
concept of the current account, which includes
current earnings on capital as well as trade in
goods and services. Putting aside errors and omis-
sions in the data, the capital account surplus is
necessarily equal to the current account deficit.
By the same token, a country with a current
account surplus simultaneously has a capital
account deficit—that is, it is importing more
capital claims than it is exporting. In the official
statistics reported by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, this side of the ledger is called the
“Capital and Financial Account.”
A country’s trade balance and its capital
account are clearly very closely related. From an
economist’s perspective, the flows of goods and
services that comprise the trade balance tell only
part of the story of a country’s international eco-
nomic relations. I’m going to concentrate on the
capital account because that part of the interna-
tional economic story is commonly neglected.
A common mistake is to treat international
capital flows as though they are passively respond-
ing to what is happening in the current account.
The trade deficit, it is said, is financed by U.S.
borrowing abroad. In fact, investors abroad buy
U.S. assets not for the purpose of financing the
U.S. trade deficit but because they believe these
are sound investments promising a good combina-
tion of safety and return. Many of these invest-
ments have nothing whatsoever to do with bor-
rowing in the conventional meaning of the word,
but instead involve purchases of land, busi-
nesses, and common stock in the United States.
Foreign auto companies, for example, have pur-
chased land and built manufacturing plants in
the United States. These simple examples should
make clear that a careful analysis of the nature
of international capital flows is necessary before
offering judgments about the U.S. external
imbalance.
RECENT TRENDS IN THE U.S.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
POSITION
Examining recent trends in the U.S. interna-
tional financial position will help to uncover
key facts and issues. There is a huge amount of
detailed data in official U.S. statistics. I’ll draw
on some of that information.
The capital account measures the change in
the net foreign asset position of a country for a
given period, such as a year. For the United States,
the capital account includes the accumulation of
foreign assets by U.S. residents as well as the
accumulation of U.S. assets by foreigners. In the
U.S. balance of payments accounts, each of these
gross asset flows is broken down into “official”
flows—representing asset purchases by govern-
ments and central banks—and “private” flows—
representing the purchases of individuals and
corporate entities. These totals are further broken
down by type of asset—government securities,
corporate bonds, private equity—in tables report-
ing the international investment position of the
United States.
The sheer volume of international financial
flows is truly phenomenal. According to the Bank
for International Settlements, in 2001 trade in
foreign currencies averaged $1.2 trillion per day,
and trading in derivatives averaged $1.4 trillion
per day. Much of this daily activity nets out when
measuring quarterly and annual flows, but even
the quarterly and annual magnitudes have been
quite large. Moreover, they have been rising sig-
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foreign-owned U.S. assets increased by an average
of $155 billion per year during the 1980s. Since
2000, foreign ownership of U.S. assets increased
at an average rate of $833 billion per year—more
than a fivefold increase. In 2000, over $1 trillion
of assets were sold to foreign entities.
Growth of U.S. ownership of foreign assets
has shown similar, if not quite so remarkable,
growth. Averaging $95 billion during the 1980s,
the U.S. entities have accumulated foreign assets
at a rate of $366 billion per year over the past three
years. Over the entire span of this comparison,
the volume of U.S. assets owned abroad has out-
paced our accumulation of foreign assets—a capi-
tal account surplus that has moved our country
from a positive to a negative net asset position.
It is sometimes said that the United States
has become a net debtor. The word “debtor” is
extremely misleading in this context, for the U.S.
assets owned by foreigners include equities and
physical capital located in the United States, as
well as bonds issued by U.S. entities. Moreover,
the part of the U.S. international financial position
that is debt, by which I mean bonds and other
fixed claims such as bank loans, is predominantly
denominated in dollars. A country with most of
its debt denominated in its own currency is in a
very different situation from one whose debt is
denominated in other currencies. The familiar
crises experienced by several Asian countries in
1997-98, by Mexico on several occasions, by
Argentina, and by numerous other countries have
all involved situations in which the impacted
countries have had large external debts denomi-
nated in foreign currencies.
The balance-of-payments accounts provide
estimates of annual international investment
flows. These accumulate over time to change the
stocks of assets. Data on the stocks are available
and are referred to as measures of the U.S. inter-
national investment position.
As recently as the early 1980s, the U.S. had
a positive net investment position. As a conse-
quence of large capital inflows in the 1980s and
late 1990s, the United States today has the world’s
largest negative net international investment posi-
tion. By the end of 2002, foreigners owned more
than $9 trillion of U.S. assets, based on market
values, while U.S.-owned assets abroad reached
a level of not quite $6.5 trillion. Hence, at the end
of last year, the U.S. net international investment
position represented a negative net position of
$2.6 trillion, about 25 percent of U.S. GDP.
This new role for the United States, with its
negative net international investment position,
has been a source of consternation among those
who see the globalization of financial markets as
a worrisome phenomenon. I am much more san-
guine about the U.S. international asset position.
To explain why I view the rapid growth of cross-
border financial market activity in a positive light,
I’ll discuss some basic economic principles that
underlie changes in the U.S. net international
position. It would be a mistake, though, to think
that the United States is in uncharted waters; other
prosperous countries have had large negative
international investment positions without getting
into trouble, and the United States itself was in
this position for decades prior to World War I.
TRADE AND CAPITAL FLOWS
In today’s world, with electronic funds trans-
fers, financial derivatives, and largely unrestricted
capital flows, investors have a global marketplace
in which to seek profitable returns and diversify
risk. In such an environment, we should consider
the possibility that aggregate patterns of inter-
national trade flows may simply be the by-product
of a process through which financial resources
are seeking their most efficient allocations in a
worldwide capital market. That is, instead of
thinking that capital flows are financing the cur-
rent account deficit, it may well be that the trade
deficit is, so to speak, financing capital flows
driven by investors seeking the best combination
of risk and return in the international capital
market.
While such a conclusion is surely an over-
statement, I believe that it does contain an impor-
tant element of truth. Capital flows are a highly
dynamic feature of the international economy;
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can alter capital flows quickly and force changes
in the trade account. To paint a more complete
picture of the broad nexus of forces driving trade
and investment patterns around the world, I
will describe three complementary views of how
cross-border goods and asset flows are jointly
determined.1
Perhaps the most basic model for explaining
a country’s international position could be called
“the trade view,” which focuses explicitly on the
factors determining the import and export of
goods and services. Under this perspective, the
emphasis is on the economic conditions that deter-
mine whether a country runs a deficit in trade.
The capital account simply measures the offsetting
financial transactions that take place; investors
are treated as passive players who finance what
is happening in the dynamic trade sector. This
view lends itself naturally to the application of
basic principles of demand theory. The quantity
of goods and services that a country imports
depends on income and the relative price of
imports, which is determined importantly by the
exchange rate. Exports depend on the responses
of a country’s trading partners to changes in their
income and exchange rate movements.
Economists who have taken an empirical
approach to estimating these demand relation-
ships have found that the trade view can explain
much about the fluctuations in trade and capital
flows that we observe across countries. But their
estimates have also presented a puzzle: U.S.
import demand responds more strongly to changes
in income growth than corresponding income
responses in other countries. This finding means
that, in the long run, with exchange rates settling
at their equilibrium values and U.S. and foreign
growth rates equal, the U.S. is predicted to run a
persistently widening current account deficit.
Alternatively, a widening deficit could be halted
by a persistent depreciation of the dollar, or by
suffering a persistently slower growth rate than
the rest of the world.
The conclusion is that either the United States
is destined to face some combination of these
undesirable outcomes—a continuously depreci-
ating currency and/or lower GDP growth than
the rest of the world—or the demand equations
of the trade view are missing something. What
might be missing is some important factor outside
the trade view that can explain the recent histori-
cal trend of a widening U.S. current account
deficit in an environment in which U.S. GDP
growth is on average higher than growth in much
of the rest of the world and in which the dollar,
despite short-run fluctuations, is on average rela-
tively strong and not persistently depreciating.
A second perspective of current account/
capital account determination is best explained
through accounting identities of the National
Income and Product Accounts. The National
Accounts are structured such that the total out-
put—the GDP—of the United States is divided
into principal components of consumption, invest-
ment, spending by government on goods and serv-
ices, and exports. Total income from production
can be either consumed or saved. These relation-
ships imply that a current account deficit must
equal the difference between U.S. domestic
investment, or capital formation, and total U.S.
saving by both the private sector and government.
This view suggests several explanations for
U.S. current account deficits. One explanation
that gained popularity in the 1980s was that large,
persistent government budget deficits reduced
national saving and thereby induced an inflow
of financing from abroad. This “twin-deficit”
argument has some appeal, particularly in that
it suggests a key role for capital account flows.
The argument is that claims on U.S. assets are
exported to help finance government budget
deficits. Indeed, the growth of the U.S. capital
account surplus has included a vast accumula-
tion of U.S. Treasury debt by foreigners. It is esti-
mated that over $1.4 trillion of U.S. Treasury debt
is currently held by foreigners, representing about
37 percent of the total outstanding. It is important
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1 In describing these three views and highlighting the importance of international capital flows, I draw on the work of Catherine L. Mann, a
former economist at the Fed who is now a Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C. (Mann, 2002).to recognize, however, that foreign purchases of
any U.S. assets, and not just Treasury bonds, serve
to help finance the government budget deficit.
The twin-deficits explanation, however, is
clearly inadequate. While this explanation
appeared to fit the facts of U.S. experience in the
1980s, the relationship breaks down when exam-
ining other episodes. One recent example is the
United States during the late 1990s, when the
current account deficit persistently widened
while the government budget moved from deficit
to surplus. In other countries that have experi-
enced large swings in government deficits and
current account deficits, the twin-deficits theory
doesn’t seem to hold up in terms of timing or
magnitude either.
Another explanation suggested by the savings/
investment view is that periods of high invest-
ment demand—like the late 1990s in the United
States—fully absorb domestic savings and require
additional external financing. This explanation
puts a completely different spin on current
account deficits. If we are exporting claims on
U.S. assets—financing abroad by selling bonds,
equities, and claims on productive facilities—to
fund productive investment opportunities, the
payoff from those investments will finance the
obligations incurred. This is a classic example of
how financial markets can be used to exploit
productive opportunities that might otherwise
be unavailable.
From this perspective, the profitability of U.S.
investment opportunities makes the United States
something of an “oasis of prosperity,” attracting
savings from around the world from those who
wish to share in the returns and safety of investing
in U.S. markets. On this view, trade and current
account deficits are induced by the dynamic role
of the United States in world capital markets.
And yet this savings/investment view also
appears incomplete and not in accord with recent
facts. The U.S. external imbalance has continued
to widen in recent years despite the fact that
growth in the investment component of GDP
dropped precipitously during the recent recession
and has only recently shown signs of picking up.
Moreover, returns in the U.S. equity market were
pretty miserable from early 2000 until quite
recently. Again, we seem to be left with only part
of the story.
A third view of the U.S. external imbalance
can, I believe, help complete the story. Just as the
savings/investment view exploits the accounting
identities of the National Accounts, an “interna-
tional capital markets view” can be derived from
the identity that one country’s deficit is balanced
by another country’s surplus. From this perspec-
tive, capital account adjustment can play an impor-
tant independent role that is determined by the
motivations of both foreign and domestic
investors. In particular, we can think of capital
market flows as the equilibrium outcome of
investors worldwide seeking to acquire portfo-
lios that balance risk and return through diversi-
fication.
THE U.S. ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS
Current commentary on international eco-
nomic issues pays far too little attention to the
role of the United States in international capital
markets. The globalization of financial markets—
spurred by technological advances and liberaliza-
tion of capital flow restrictions worldwide—has
created entirely new investment opportunities
for investors in both the United States and abroad.
These new opportunities have undoubtedly given
rise to a re-balancing of portfolios, and there are
reasons to believe that this process might be
associated with a net export of claims on U.S.
assets—a capital account surplus.
U.S. financial markets are among the most
highly developed in the world, offering efficiency,
transparency, and liquidity. Moreover, the U.S.
dollar serves as both a medium of exchange and
a unit of account in many international transac-
tions. These factors make dollar-denominated
claims attractive assets in any international port-
folio. No capital market in the world has a com-
bination of strengths superior to that of the United
States. Our advantages include the promise of a
good return, safety, secure political institutions,
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expertise. The United States has worked hard for
generations to create outstanding capital markets;
our latest efforts to improve corporate governance
should be viewed as simply another chapter in
an ongoing story.
For some purposes, it is useful to think of
U.S. financial markets as serving as a world finan-
cial intermediary. Just as a bank, or a mutual
fund, channels the savings of many individuals
toward productive investments, the U.S. financial
markets play a similar role for many investors
from around the world. In the process, individuals,
companies, and governments around the world
accumulate dollar-denominated assets to serve
as a vehicle for facilitating transactions and stor-
ing liquid wealth safely.
A bank earns its return on capital by paying
a lower interest rate to depositors than it earns
on its assets. Similarly, the United States earns a
higher return on its investments abroad than for-
eigners do on their investments in the United
States. Despite the fact that the U.S. international
investment position at the end of 2002 was –$2.6
trillion, U.S. net income in 2002 on its investments
abroad slightly exceeded income payments on
foreign-owned assets in the United States.
How is the United States able to earn a signifi-
cantly higher return on its assets abroad than for-
eigners earn on their assets in the United States?
A very simple example is currency, which pays a
zero return. At the end of 2002, U.S. currency
held abroad was estimated to be about $300 bil-
lion, whereas only a trivial amount of foreign
currency is held in the United States.
More generally, many private and govern-
mental investors abroad rely on the U.S. capital
market as the best place to invest in extremely
safe and highly liquid securities. Along a spec-
trum of safety and liquidity, these assets include
currency, U.S. government obligations, agency
debt, and corporate bonds. U.S. equity markets
are also highly liquid. The United States as a
whole earns a return from providing these safe
and liquid investments to the world. Indeed, the
desire of foreigners to hold U.S. Treasury securi-
ties is a testament to the confidence that the world
has in the safety and soundness of our financial
system.
Recent data show just how impressive is the
world’s appetite for safe U.S. assets. Over the six
quarters ending with the second quarter of this
year, total outstanding U.S. government debt rose
by about $345 billion, while foreign holdings of
such debt have risen by about $304 billion.
Another force at work may be a gradual break-
down in the home bias to investment. For some
years, international economists have noted that
investors tend to hold portfolios that are weighted
more toward domestic assets than would appear
optimal by the principles of diversification—
there is home-bias to investor behavior. Business
cycles and investment risks are not perfectly
synchronized across countries; a balanced inter-
national portfolio can help to diversify risk. The
opening of global capital markets has allowed
investors to exploit these opportunities, particu-
larly foreign investors who are able to participate
in the relative openness of U.S. capital markets
and the multinational diversification of U.S.
corporations.
Another aspect of the situation may be a con-
sequence of demographics. Europe and Japan,
especially, have populations that are aging more
rapidly than does the United States. Just as a
retired household typically consumes more than
its income, drawing down retirement savings in
the process, so also may an entire country draw
down international investments to finance the
consumption of its retired population. Japan espe-
cially has a high saving rate relative to its domes-
tic investment rate; it is accumulating assets
abroad that may be run down in future years to
support its elderly population. This process is
one that will work out over many years. What
may appear to be an “imbalance” this year may
make perfect sense over a long-term horizon.
While the international capital markets view
provides a perspective on some unique influences
on U.S. current account/capital account imbal-
ances, it is entirely consistent with the alternative
perspectives.
As foreigners decide to accumulate dollar-
denominated assets, U.S. interest rates are kept
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to increase investment demand in the United
States. This investment demand, incidentally,
includes both corporate demand for capital for-
mation and household demand for new housing.
The total demand for funds also includes the U.S.
government’s demand, which may be temporarily
high as a consequence of the war on terrorism,
Iraq, and the 2001-03 period of recession and
slow recovery. These factors are consistent with
the savings/investment perspective that helps to
understand why the United States has a capital
inflow and the associated current account deficit.
IS THE U.S. EXTERNAL
IMBALANCE SUSTAINABLE?
When considering widening external imbal-
ances like those that the United States has expe-
rienced in recent years, a natural question is
whether or not current trends are sustainable.
Indeed, with a current account deficit equal to 5
percent of GDP and a negative international invest-
ment position that amounts to 25 percent of GDP,
some have drawn comparisons with countries
such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico at times of
severe balance of payments crises.
I consider it highly unlikely that such a crisis
will befall the United States. As a stable, diversi-
fied industrial economy, the United States is not
likely to suffer from a sudden lack of confidence
by investors. In fact, other industrialized econ-
omies have incurred much larger external obliga-
tions without precipitating crises. For example,
Australia’s negative net investment position
reached 60 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s,
Ireland’s exceeded 70 percent in the 1980s, and
New Zealand accumulated a position amounting
to nearly 90 percent of GDP in the late 1990s.
Notably, these economies have recently been
among the most successful—in terms of economic
growth—in the industrialized world. Indeed, the
combination of rising external obligations and
prospects for robust growth is entirely consistent
with the view of the capital account I have dis-
cussed today.
Moreover, the international capital markets
view suggests that the United States is not only
more like those countries that have experienced
high levels of debt without obvious ill effects—
but that the U.S. case is, in some sense, unique.
The central role of U.S. financial markets—and
of the dollar—in the world economy suggests that
capital account surpluses are being driven by
foreign demand for U.S. assets, rather than by any
structural imbalance in the U.S. economy itself.
To be sure, no country can permanently incur
rising levels of net external obligations relative to
GDP. If sustained indefinitely, service payments
on ever-increasing obligations would ultimately
exceed national income. Long before that situa-
tion of literal insolvency occurred, however, mar-
ket forces would drive changes in exchange rates,
interest rate differentials, and relative growth
rates in such a way to move the economy toward
a sustainable path. Nevertheless, such adjustments
need not be sudden, large, or disruptive as they
have sometimes been for countries with severe
balance-of-payments crises.
Not only are there market forces that will
restore equilibrium, should the current situation
not correct itself, but more importantly the inter-
national capital markets may well be looking
ahead to changing circumstances that will reduce
the capital flows to the United States in coming
years. I’ve already mentioned the demographic
forces at work. Another possibility is that eco-
nomic growth will rise elsewhere in the world,
raising demands both for U.S. exports and for
international capital to finance higher growth.
Given the strength of U.S. multinational corpo-
rations, U.S. firms will share in the profits from
higher growth abroad, and some of those earnings
will be repatriated to the United States.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The international financial markets view of
U.S. international capital account determination
that I have described today highlights the dynamic
role of international capital adjustments as
investors exploit the opportunities of globalized
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progress and capital-market liberalizations that
have driven this process have evolved over time,
the process has been protracted. Ultimately, how-
ever, when portfolio adjustments have optimally
exploited new diversification opportunities, and as
growth abroad rises, the net international invest-
ment position of the United States will stabilize.
If this view is correct, the forces driving the
U.S. capital account represent a persistent, but
ultimately temporary, process that might result
in a higher level of net indebtedness without
necessarily posing any threat to the sustainabil-
ity of the U.S. international investment position.
Nor will the transition to a sustainable long-run
path necessarily require wrenching adjustments
in domestic or international markets or in
exchange rates.
In the meanwhile, we can all benefit from
our good fortune to have access to increasingly
safe, liquid, and transparent financial markets.
The United States has created for itself a com-
parative advantage in capital markets, and we
should not be surprised that investors all over
the world come to buy the product.
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